Featured, Features, frontpage, Online — March 22, 2016 at 8:54 pm

Religious Freedom as a National Security Imperative: A New Paradigm

By Amjad Mahmood Khan*


This Article proffers a hitherto understated mechanism for the establishment, maintenance and cogent analysis of national security: the establishment and maintenance of religious pluralism. To date, official positions and scholarship sparingly comment on this assertion. To address these gaps and to offer a fresh perspective on this subject, this Article undertakes a legal analysis to buttress the notion that U.S. national security interests can be best served by working towards the establishment of religious pluralism around the globe. Due to its strategic relevance for U.S. national security, the case of Pakistan – and the constitutional and legal apparatus that undergirds its view of religious minorities – serves as a blueprint for understanding this new national security paradigm (“NNSP”).


“Stated simply: There is not a single nation in the world that both respects religious freedom and poses a security threat to the United States.”[1]

In the 1660s, Congregationalists tortured and hanged four Quaker missionaries in Boston Common.[2] Yet a century later, Americans introduced a standard of religious liberty that remains a model for statecraft up to the modern day. As Thomas Farr notes, “theology and politics” – not secularism alone – can claim responsibility for this revolution. In Farr’s view, this explains why American-Muslims, despite being exposed to Wahhabi doctrines, have not been radicalized like European-Muslims have.[3] Strangely, America has failed to take lessons from its own past when tackling national security issues. Consider that before September 11, 2001, foreign policy experts viewed the Taliban’s actions to have no bearing on national security. “Yet the very same conditions of religious intolerance that were appalling to human rights advocates were appealing to al Qaeda.”[4] The Economist has noted: “The strange thing is that when America has tried to tackle religious politics abroad – especially jihadist violence – it has drawn no lessons from its domestic success. Why has a country so rooted in pluralism made so little of religious freedom?”[5]

The Obama administration has defined national security in terms of domestic intelligence, economy, education, energy, federal deficit reduction, healthcare, immigration, infrastructure, natural disasters, organized crime, science and innovation, trade, and travel.[6]  It has not, however, explicitly considered religious pluralism as a key component of its national security strategy (NSS).  Even the most recent NSS makes a mere passing reference towards the importance of protecting the rights of religious minorities.[7] Moreover, scholarship that approaches NSS from this lens does so sparingly, and more so from a geopolitical perspective.

Given the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of “national security,” and upon grounds addressed in this Article, national security would be best served by including the establishment and maintenance of global religious pluralism as a central component of its strategy. That religious expression should generally be factored into national security is not a recent notion. In his inaugural address in 1881, President James Garfield addressed the preservation of national security while addressing what he perceived to be a threat the Mormon Church posed to American life.[8]

Accordingly, this Article proffers a new national security paradigm (NNSP) whereby religious pluralism can be established and can further national security interests by laying emphasis on the country’s common and statutory law.  First, this Article provides an overview of the current understanding and weaknesses of national security as well as an introduction and justification for the implementation of the proposed NNSP.  Second, this Article analyzes how the NNSP could be implemented in Pakistan as a case study.  Specifically, the Article examines Article 20 of Pakistan’s Constitution, which by its very express meaning restricts religious freedom in the name of national security.[9]  According to Pakistan’s Constitution, Pakistani national security is inextricably intertwined with religious expression.  Therefore, U.S. NSS must also approach American-Pakistani diplomatic relations from this lens.


A. Current Paradigm

Why have policymakers failed to incorporate religious pluralism into U.S. NSS?  One study concludes, “U.S. government officials are often reluctant to address the issue of religion, whether in response to a secular U.S. legal and political tradition [or] because religion is perceived as too complicated or sensitive.  Current U.S. government frameworks for approaching religion are narrow, often approaching religions as problematic or monolithic forces, overemphasizing a terrorism-focused analysis of Islam and sometimes marginalizing religion as a peripheral humanitarian or cultural issue.”[10] Indeed, officials such as Henry Kissinger[11] and Madeleine Albright[12] have not been reticent about this position either.

To date, no agreed upon definition of national security exists.[13] The National Security Act of 1947 does not provide a definition, despite referring to “national security” more than 100 times.[14] Nor does the PATRIOT Act.[15] This Article, therefore, adopts the following definition of national security as a starting point, put forth by Judge James E. Baker, former Chief Judge to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces: “[National security concerns itself with events that] (1) threaten drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threaten significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state.”[16]

B. A New National Security Paradigm

  1. Risks of Excluding Religious Pluralism from NSS

Policy makers cannot assume that national security objectives can be achieved through democratization, while leaving religious pluralism unaddressed. Thomas Farr notes that following 2001, when a democratic constitution and government were introduced into Afghanistan, the persecution of Afghani women and minority Shiite Muslims significantly declined.[17] Religious pluralism, however, remains elusive. “The Afghan government no longer tortures people on the basis of religion, but it continues to bring charges against apostates and blasphemers, including officials and journalists seeking to debate the teachings of Islam.”[18]

Additionally, in 1999, the House International Relations Committee was briefed regarding regimes or non-state actors considered gross violators of religious freedom. With the exception of Burma, those very regimes or non-state actors would eventually threaten United States national security; namely, the Afghani Taliban, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and Sudan.[19] William Inboden, former Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council, notes that the relationship between religious pluralism and national security extends back much further:

“Including World War II, every major war the United States has fought over the past 70 years has been against an enemy that also severely violated religious freedom … from the Nazi Reich cult, to atheistic communism, to Serbian Orthodox nationalism, to Arab Baathism, to Islamist theocracy, to militant jihadism as practiced by Hezbollah or al Qaeda. They ranged from superpowers, to fragile states, to global ideological movements, to transnational terrorist organizations. Yet one of the very few characteristics that all shared was an abiding hostility to religious freedom.”[20]

A recent study of 143 countries concludes, “to the extent that governments and societies restrict religious freedoms, physical persecution and conflict increase.”[21] It is alarming, then, that religious freedom is severely restricted for 70% of the world’s population – and Islam is the religion of the majority in most of these countries.[22]

Religious intolerance also implies a sacred right to iconoclasm and becomes central to the identity of rogue elements. The TTP, for example, has explicitly called for, “replac[ing] the English system of democracy with Islamic Shariah” because “the Pakistani system has nothing to do with Islam.”[23]

  1. Merits of Including Religious Pluralism into the NSS

As weaker factions of society enjoy fundamental civil liberties, the state’s legitimacy is reinforced.[24] In this scenario, a culture of human rights could develop and institutionalize domestically.[25] As international relations scholar Peter Katzenstein notes, “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors.”[26] Religious pluralism would help neutralize monolith doctrines, thereby preventing the formation of related power blocs.

The NNSP is also in harmony with mainstream political theory and American statecraft philosophy.  In his 1939 State of the Union Address, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt acknowledged the proposed NNSP by noting the global threat to three “indispensable” American institutions:

“The first is religion. It is the source of the other two—democracy and international good faith … In a modern civilization, all three—religion, democracy and international good faith—complement and support each other … Where freedom of religion has been attacked, the attack has come from sources opposed to democracy … And where religion and democracy have vanished, good faith and reason in international affairs have given way to strident ambition and brute force … The defense of religion, of democracy, and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all.”[27]

As it fosters tolerant societies, the NSSP pursues the same goals as democratic peace theory espoused by Kant,[28] Paine,[29] and Tocqueville.[30] Because it would allow religious minorities to participate in public life and hold their representatives accountable, the NNSP fosters the same environment of accountability that Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen considers central to a functioning democracy.[31] Operating in the same manner as what University of Chicago Law School’s Professor Aziz Huq terms “social action,” the NNSP can engender “ideological competition,” whereby a marketplace of ideas “raises terrorism’s propagandizing and recruitment costs.”[32] In the alternative scenario, population segregation inhibits idea exchange and increases alienation; and a subsequent diaspora can spread this infection.[33] One study notes that “80% of new recruits to the global Salafi jihad emerge from the diaspora” originally from Muslim majority nations.[34] By promoting ideological competition, religious pluralism can neutralize those authoritarian regimes regulating the level of religious activity.[35] With terrorists taking a grassroots approach to recruitment,[36] the NNSP offers an effective counterbalance. Indeed, the 2010 National Security Strategy noted, “[the] best defenses against [the] threat [of terrorism within the United States] are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions.”[37]


A. History of Radicalization in Pakistan

While Pakistan was conceived as a state for Muslims, its founder never considered it to be a Muslim state. Addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan days before Pakistan’s independence, Mohammed Ali Jinnah declared, “[Y]ou will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”[38] The 1962 Constitution declared the country to be the “Republic of Pakistan,”[39] removing “Islamic” from the previous designation of the 1956 Constitution.[40] But the efforts of pan-Islamic demagogues such as Abul Ala Maudoodi[41] and the political savvy of the likes of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto[42] would cause Pakistan to adopt a third constitution in 1973, naming the country once again the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and stating in Article 2, “Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan.”[43]

Following a military coup, Gen. Zia-ul Haq mandated Islamic studies instruction as a component of Pakistan’s education system and, with its role in the Afghan-Soviet conflict of the 1980s, tacitly encouraged the festering of radicalization in Pakistan’s madrassas.[44] Reverberations of Gen. Zia’s measures and their connection to the lack of religious pluralism – including his introduction of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws – are apparent to this day. Today, the Urdu word for secularism, la diniya or “no religion,” has come to be conflated with “anti-religion.”[45] Regarding the link between national security and these blasphemy laws, Thomas Farr notes:

“If the blasphemy laws were to be taken off the books, Islamists would lose a favored instrument for targeting religious minorities, intimidating moderate Muslims, and enhancing the Islamist reach in government and society. Pakistan’s maladies are legion, so the end of the blasphemy laws would hardly be a blanket palliative. But it could serve as one ameliorating measure to undermine extremist elements. In a related vein, American support for religious-freedom protections for peaceful Muslims in divided, fragile societies such as Afghanistan or Yemen would also aid counterterrorism efforts by building trust among the populace and increasing their confidence in sharing intelligence tips.”[46]

Three incidents from 2011 are illustrative. In 2009, Asiya Bibi, a Pakistani Christian woman, was accused of insulting Prophet Muhammad and sentenced to death.[47] In response, Salman Taseer, the Governor of Punjab, publicly defended Bibi and sought a presidential pardon.[48] In early January 2011, Momtaz Qadri would assassinate Taseer.[49] More striking than being Taseer’s bodyguard, Qadri belonged to a Sufi organization opposed to the Taliban and the Deobandis (who argue that Western emulation has caused Muslim decadence).[50]

In early March 2011, Pakistan’s Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti, Pakistan’s only Christian minister, was assassinated following strong criticism of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws.[51] Then, in early May 2011, Osama bin Laden was found and killed inside a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.[52] Independent sources, including senior American officials, believe that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency had an independently operated desk to only handle Bin Laden.[53] Further analysis indicates that many amongst Pakistan’s security establishment who support the blasphemy laws are also closely linked to Pakistani militant groups that appear to have helped shelter Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.[54]

B. Constitutional and Legal Apparatus Concerning Religious Freedom

Pakistan’s peculiar treatment of religious freedom as a constitutional and legal matter has been well-documented.  Article 20 of Pakistan’s Constitution states: “Subject to law, public order and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion.”  For over forty years with little exception,[55] Pakistan courts have seized on the limiting language in this provision to uphold restrictions to particular religious beliefs and practices.  This is perhaps best illustrated in the sordid history surrounding Article 260 of Pakistan’s Constitution, which uniquely defines who is or is not a “Muslim,” and which has been constitutionally amended to exclude an entire religious community of Ahmadis as non-Muslim.[56]

Strict interpretations of Article 20 have gained further legitimacy and expression through Pakistan’s criminal code, which prohibits and punishes blasphemous speech or activities.  The anti-blasphemy criminal provisions are a legal tool to restrict the religious beliefs and practices of religious minorities, especially groups like Ahmadis who profess and self-identify as Muslims but who are legally declared to be non-Muslims.[57]  Though intended to protect and preserve “public order and morality,” Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws correlate to an uptick in terrorism and sectarian violence.[58]  Put differently, Pakistan’s constitutional and legal apparatus concerning religious freedom is wrapped up in a highly tenuous notion that restricting religious freedom can maintain public order and morality within Pakistan borders.

C. Resetting U.S.-Pakistan Security Relations

As extremists in Pakistan operate under the guise of preserving “law, public order and morality,” U.S. NSS must focus ensuring that Article 20 fosters religious pluralism. Military aid and economic aid alone are incapable of achieving U.S. NSS objectives. As this Article has demonstrated, the establishment and maintenance of religious pluralism must be a central component of U.S. NSS in Pakistan. Both military aid and economic aid have, in fact, proven wasteful, even counterproductive.

Military aid has proven largely ineffective, reinforcing Pakistan’s reliance on a garrison state to function and Pakistani military elite swallowing up the lion’s share of aid.[59] In line with the proposed NNSP, Dan Markey, of the Council on Foreign Relations, advises that U.S. military aid to Pakistan should be contingent upon Pakistan’s commitment to addressing the root causes of extremism.[60]

Economic aid, too, has not helped achieve U.S. NSS objectives. Millions have been wasted in recent efforts to democratize Pakistan’s political parties,[61] and billions have been spent towards unrealized goals for the last decade.[62]  One study, using Pakistan as a working model, suggests that economic aid actually contributes towards conflict in the recipient country.[63] It is fitting, then, that the U.S. recently threatened to withhold $300 million of civilian aid if Pakistan did not enhance its efforts to address extremist elements inside Pakistan.[64] Religious pluralism, in fact, can help realize U.S. economic development goals. Harvard’s Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary argue that because religious beliefs cultivate individual behavior, which enhances productivity, the extent of a country’s religious belief is proportional to its economic growth.[65] It should follow, then, that religious pluralism is conducive to economic development. A 2015 study does not contradict this assumption.[66]

Despite these dim realities, economic aid must still be a component of U.S. NSS.  But substantial progress towards U.S. NSS objectives requires the establishment and maintenance of religious pluralism in the core of U.S. NSS.  Indeed, despite Pakistan having a 96% Muslim population, of which nearly 90% are Sunni Muslim,[67] Pakistani Muslims’ religious expression is restricted.[68]  US foreign policy should expect more in emerging Muslim-majority democracies such as Pakistan, where there is already some express commitment in law and culture to fundamental rights, including equality under the law and religious freedom, however tenuous that commitment might be.  Within such democracies, the greatest progress is possible both because of the presence of liberal reformers and because of the mounting evidence that democracy cannot succeed without religious liberty.[69]


Religious freedom should be reimagined and reformulated as a United States national security imperative.  Legal and policy analysts must account for religious pluralism not simply as an intrinsic democratic value or aspiration but as a crucial element of U.S. NSS objectives.  In cases such as Pakistan, where religious freedom is perversely and ironically suppressed in the name of preserving “public order and morality,” the U.S. risks endangering itself by failing to view the protection of religious freedom abroad as a counter security measure.


*Adjunct Professor, UCLA Law School; Partner, Brown, Neri, Smith & Khan LLP; B.A., Claremont McKenna College (2001); J.D., Harvard Law School (2004). A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the author has represented refugees escaping religious persecution and has testified five times before the United States House of Representatives about anti-blasphemy laws in the Islamic world and resulting human rights abuses of religious minorities. He can be reached at amjad@post.harvard.edu. This article benefitted from the excellent research assistance and comments of Sardar Anees Ahmad.

[1] William Inboden, Religious Freedom and National Security, Hᴏᴏᴠᴇʀ Pᴏʟɪᴄʏ Rᴇᴠɪᴇᴡ, (October 2, 2012), available at http://www.hoover.org/research/religious-freedom-and-national-security.

[2] Jᴀᴍᴇs F. Hᴀʀʀɪs, Tʜᴇ Sᴇʀᴘᴇɴᴛɪɴᴇ Wᴀʟʟ: Tʜᴇ Wɪɴᴅɪɴɢ Bᴏᴜɴᴅᴀʀʏ ʙᴇᴛᴡᴇᴇɴ Cʜᴜʀᴄʜ ᴀɴᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs 98 (2013).

[3] Thomas F. Farr, Diplomacy in an Age of Faith, Fᴏʀᴇɪɢɴ Aғғᴀɪʀs, (March/April 2008), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2008-03-02/diplomacy-age-faith.

[4] See Inboden, supra note 1.

[5] The Economist, The Lesson From America, available at http://www.economist.com/node/10015163 (last visited Dec. 27, 2015).

[6] Pʀᴇsɪᴅᴇɴᴛ Bᴀʀᴀᴄᴋ Oʙᴀᴍᴀ, Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ Sᴛʀᴀᴛᴇɢʏ 2, 14, 29–30 (2010), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

[7] Pʀᴇsɪᴅᴇɴᴛ Bᴀʀᴀᴄᴋ Oʙᴀᴍᴀ, Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ Sᴛʀᴀᴛᴇɢʏ 20 (2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

[8] President James Garfield, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1881), Iɴᴀᴜɢᴜʀᴀʟ Aᴅᴅʀᴇssᴇs ᴏғ Tʜᴇ Pʀᴇsɪᴅᴇɴᴛs ᴏғ Tʜᴇ Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs 162 (Bicentennial ed. 1989) (“[No religious group would] usurp in the smallest degree the functions and powers of the National Government.”).

[9] Pᴀᴋ Cᴏɴsᴛ. art. 20 (recognizing religious expression of all Pakistan’s citizens “Subject to law, public order and morality.”).

[10] Liora Danan & Alice Hunt, Mixed Blessings U.S. Government Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2008), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070820_religion.pdf.

[11] See generally Rɪᴄʜᴀʀᴅ P. Cʟᴀᴜᴅᴇ & Bᴜʀɴs H. Wᴇsᴛᴏɴ, Hᴜᴍᴀɴ Rɪɢʜᴛs ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Wᴏʀʟᴅ Cᴏᴍᴍᴜɴɪᴛʏ: Issᴜᴇs ᴀɴᴅ Aᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 376 (2006).

[12] Mᴀᴅᴇʟᴇɪɴᴇ Aʟʙʀɪɢʜᴛ, Tʜᴇ Mɪɢʜᴛʏ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Aʟᴍɪɢʜᴛʏ 8 (2006).

[13] See generally Christopher M. Tipler, Defining ‘National Security’: Resolving Ambiguity in the CFIUS Regulations, 35 J. Int’l L. 1223 (2014), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/12.

[14] See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006)).

[15] Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350–52 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).

[16] Jᴀᴍᴇs E. Bᴀᴋᴇʀ, Iɴ Tʜᴇ Cᴏᴍᴍᴏɴ Dᴇғᴇɴsᴇ: Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ Lᴀᴡ ғᴏʀ Pᴇʀɪʟᴏᴜs Tɪᴍᴇs 16 (2007).

[17] See Farr, supra note 3.

[18] Id.

[19]The First Annual State Department Report on International Religious Freedom Before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 106th Cong. 2-5 (1999) (statement of Robert Seiple, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, Dept. of State)., available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg64167/html/CHRG-106hhrg64167.htm.

[20] See Inboden, supra note 1.

[21] Bʀɪᴀɴ Gʀɪᴍ & Rᴏɢᴇʀ Fɪɴᴋᴇ, Tʜᴇ Pʀɪᴄᴇ ᴏғ Fʀᴇᴇᴅᴏᴍ Dᴇɴɪᴇᴅ: Rᴇʟɪɢɪᴏᴜs Pᴇʀsᴇᴄᴜᴛɪᴏɴ ᴀɴᴅ Cᴏɴғʟɪᴄᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Tᴡᴇɴᴛʏ-Fɪʀsᴛ Cᴇɴᴛᴜʀʏ 222 (2011); see also Thomas F. Farr, The Trouble With American Foreign Policy and Islam, Tʜᴇ Rᴇᴠɪᴇᴡ ᴏғ Fᴀɪᴛʜ & Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Aғғᴀɪʀs, (March/April 2008), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15570274.2011.571415

(“dearth of religious liberty is causally connected to religious violence, persecution, and terrorism”).

[22] Thomas F. Farr, The Trouble With American Foreign Policy and Islam, Rᴇᴠɪᴇᴡ ᴏғ Fᴀɪᴛʜ & Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Aғғᴀɪʀs, (March/April 2008), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15570274.2011.571415.

[23] See Bill Roggio, Taliban Commander Wants Pakistan’s Nukes, Global Islamic Caliphate, Tʜᴇ Lᴏɴɢ Wᴀʀ Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ, (March 20, 2012), available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/03/taliban_commander_wa.php.

[24] See generally Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 233-35 (2008).

[25] See, e.g., Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in Tʜᴇ Pᴏᴡᴇʀ ᴏғ Hᴜᴍᴀɴ Rɪɢʜᴛs: Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Nᴏʀᴍs ᴀɴᴅ Dᴏᴍᴇsᴛɪᴄ Cʜᴀɴɢᴇ 1, 3 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).

[26] Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security, Tʜᴇ Cᴜʟᴛᴜʀᴇ ᴏғ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ 1, 2 (1996).

[27] Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (January 4, 1939), available at http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/franklin-delano-roosevelt/state-of-the-union-1939.php.

[28] See generally Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795)

[29] See generally Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776)

[30] See generally Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835)

[31] Amartya Sen. 1999. “Democracy as a Universal Value,” 10 J. Dᴇᴍᴏᴄʀᴀᴄʏ 9 (1999) (“No substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press.”).

[32] Aziz Huq, “The Social Production of National Security,” 98 Cornell Law Review 637, 674 (2013); see also Rᴏᴅɴᴇʏ Sᴛᴀʀᴋ, Tʜᴇ Vɪᴄᴛᴏʀʏ ᴏғ Rᴇᴀsᴏɴ 199 (2005) (“[R]eligion thrives in a free market … where many religious groups vie for followers and those [religions] lacking energy or appeal fall by the wayside”).

[33] Aʟʟᴇɴ D. Hᴇʀᴛᴢᴋᴇ, Tʜᴇ Fᴜᴛᴜʀᴇ ᴏғ Rᴇʟɪɢɪᴏᴜs Fʀᴇᴇᴅᴏᴍ: Gʟᴏʙᴀʟ Cʜᴀʟʟᴇɴɢᴇs 319-21 (2013).

[34] Arie W. Kruglanski et al., “What Should This Fight Be Called?: Metaphors of Counterterrorism and Their Implications,” 8 Psʏᴄʜᴏʟ. Sᴀ. Pᴜʙ. Iʀ. 97, 114 (2008).

[35] See Inboden, supra note 1 (“Thus Putin has increased state support for the Russian Orthodox Church, and China permits religious observance only in registered outlets by its five recognized religions while subjecting independent religious groups to restriction or persecution.”)

[36] Brian Michael Jenkins, Al Qaeda in its Third Decade: Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory? 7 (2012), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ rand/pubs/occasional-papers/2012/RANDOP362.pdf (“[A]l Qaeda and its allies have increased their efforts to inspire and recruit homegrown terrorists.”).

[37] See Obama, supra note 6 at 19 (2010); see also Tʜᴇ Wʜɪᴛᴇ Hᴏᴜsᴇ, Eᴍᴘᴏᴡᴇʀɪɴɢ Lᴏᴄᴀʟ Pᴀʀᴛɴᴇʀs ᴛᴏ Pʀᴇᴠᴇɴᴛ Vɪᴏʟᴇɴᴛ Exᴛʀᴇᴍɪsᴍ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ Uɴɪᴛᴇᴅ Sᴛᴀᴛᴇs at i (2011), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf (“[counter-terrorism] is not the work of government alone.”).

[38] Mohammed Ali Jinnah, “Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan” (August 11, 1947), available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html.

[39] The 1962 Constitution of Pakistan, available at https://books.google.com/books?id=by6iPgAACAAJ&dq=pakistan+1962+constitution&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwis5_bqroLKAhXCHR4KHWLhAfYQ6AEIMzAE

[40] The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan, available at https://books.google.com/books?id=eAXHSgAACAAJ&dq=pakistan+1956+constitution&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiKlbCFsYLKAhWBlh4KHVuaCrcQ6AEIIzAB

[41] See generally Sᴇʏʏᴇᴅ Vᴀʟɪ Rᴇᴢᴀ Nᴀsʀ, Mᴀᴡᴅᴜᴅɪ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Mᴀᴋɪɴɢ ᴏғ Isʟᴀᴍɪᴄ Rᴇᴠɪᴠᴀʟɪsᴍ (1996).

[42] Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Prime minister of Pakistan, Eɴᴄʏᴄʟᴏᴘæᴅɪᴀ Bʀɪᴛᴀɴɴɪᴄᴀ, available at http://www.britannica.com/biography/Zulfikar-Ali-Bhutto (“His government, retaining martial law, began a process of Islāmization.”).

[43] Pakistan’s Constitution, available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part1.html

[44] Jayshree Bajoria, Pakistan’s Education System and Links to Extremism, available at http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-education-system-links-extremism/p20364 (last visited Dec. 29, 2015).

[45]  Ed Husain, Explaining the Salman Taseer Murder, Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏɴ Fᴏʀᴇɪɢɴ Rᴇʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴs, available at http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/explaining-salman-taseer-murder/p23755 (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).

[46] See Inboden, supra note 1.

[47] Raymond Ibrahim, Islamist “Justice”: Slow Painful Death for Christian Mother in Pakistan, Gᴀᴛᴇsᴏɴ Iɴsᴛɪᴛᴜᴛᴇ, available at http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6224/islamist-justice-pakistan (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).

[48] BBC News, Salman Taseer Murder: Killer’s Appeal Denied, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34467603 (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).

[49] Tom Wright, Leading Pakistani Politician Killed, Tʜᴇ Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛʀᴇᴇᴛ Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704723104576061371508098218 (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).

[50] See Husain, supra note 45.

[51] The Guardian, Pakistan Minister Shahbaz Bhatti Shot Dead in Islamabad, ᴡᴡᴡ.ᴛʜᴇɢᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ.ᴄᴏᴍ, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/02/pakistan-minister-shot-dead-islamabad (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).

[52] Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden, Tʜᴇ Nᴇᴡ Yᴏʀᴋᴇʀ, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/08/getting-bin-laden (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).

[53]Carlotta Gall, What Pakistan Knew About Bin Laden, Tʜᴇ Nᴇᴡ Yᴏʀᴋ Tɪᴍᴇs, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/what-pakistan-knew-about-bin-laden.html?emc=eta1&_r=2 (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).

[54] See Inboden, supra note 1.

[55] In 2015, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, led by Chief Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jillani,

issued a rare suo moto judgment prompted by a request for judicial inquiry concerning attacks on Christians in Peshawar and forced conversion of members of the Kalash tribe and Ismaili sect in Chitral. The objective of the judgment was to order the Federal Government of Pakistan to adopt a series of measures to enhance the protection of religious minorities and foster greater tolerance in Pakistani society.  In a rare liberal construction of Article 20 of Pakistan’s Constitution, Justice Jillani emphasized the need to “restore” religious freedom as an “indivisible” individual right, while “preserving and protecting” its communal aspect. He stressed the freedom to “profess, practice, and propagate [one’s] religious views even against the prevailing or dominant view of its own religious denomination or sect.” He also clarified that religious freedom must be “construed liberally” to include “freedom of conscience, thought, expression, belief, and faith.”  See Supreme Court of Pakistan. 2014. S.M.C. No. 1 of 2014 (SC) (Pak.), available at


[56] Amjad Mahmood Khan, Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An Analysis Under International Law and International Relations, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 217, 227 (Spring 2003), available at http://muslimwriters.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/ahmadiyya_persecution.pdf.

[57] Amjad Mahmood Khan, Pakistan’s Anti-Blasphemy Laws and the Illegitimate Use of the ‘Law, Public Order and Morality’ Limitation on Constitutional Rights, Rᴇᴠɪᴇᴡ ᴏғ Fᴀɪᴛʜ & Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Aғғᴀɪʀs, (Vol. 13, Issue 1, Feb 2015), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15570274.2015.1005918

[58] Amjad Mahmood Khan, How Anti-Blasphemy Laws Engender Terrorism, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 56 (May 2015), Online

[59] See generally Cʜʀɪsᴛɪɴᴇ Fᴀɪʀ, Fɪɢʜᴛɪɴɢ ᴛᴏ ᴛʜᴇ Eɴᴅ: Tʜᴇ Pᴀᴋɪsᴛᴀɴ Aʀᴍʏ’s Wᴀʏ OF Wᴀʀ (2014); see also The Economist, Hail to the Chief: Politicians Are Overshadowed by a Publicity-Seeking General, available at www.economist.com/news/asia/21667980-politicians-are-overshadowed-publicity-seeking-general-hail-chief (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).

[60] Daniel Markey, Reorienting U.S. Pakistan Strategy: From Af-Pak to Asia, Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏɴ Fᴏʀᴇɪɢɴ Rᴇʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴs, avaialable at http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/reorienting-us-pakistan-strategy/p32198 (“U.S. military aid to Pakistan should [be] conditioned on Pakistan’s effort to address internal security threats, from the Pakistani Taliban to violent sectarian groups, and on Pakistan’s overall commitment to countering violent extremism on its soil.”).

[61] Shahbaz Rana, Civilian Aid: US Project Fails to ‘Democratise’ Pakistani Parties, Tʜᴇ Exᴘʀᴇss Tʀɪʙᴜɴᴇ, available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/982992/civilian-aid-us-project-fails-to-democratise-pakistani-parties/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).

[62] Saba Imtiaz, In Pakistan, U.S. Aid Agency’s Efforts Face Skepticism, Tʜᴇ Nᴇᴡ Yᴏʀᴋ Tɪᴍᴇs, available at www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/world/asia/in-pakistan-us-aid-agencys-efforts-produce-dubious-results.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).

[63] Nadia Tahir, Does Aid Cause Conflict in Pakistan?, available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2014.1000007 (last visited Jan. 1, 2016); see generally Dᴀᴍʙɪsᴀ Mᴏʏᴏ, Dᴇᴀᴅ Aɪᴅ: Wʜʏ Aɪᴅ Is Nᴏᴛ Wᴏʀᴋɪɴɢ ᴀɴᴅ Hᴏᴡ Tʜᴇʀᴇ Is ᴀ Bᴇᴛᴛᴇʀ Wᴀʏ Fᴏʀ Aғʀɪᴄᴀ (2009).

[64] Saeed Shah et al., U.S. Threatens to Withhold Pakistan Aid, Tʜᴇ Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛʀᴇᴇᴛ Jᴏᴜʀɴᴀʟ, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-threatens-to-withhold-pakistan-aid-1440163925 (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).

[65] Robert J. Barro & Rachel M. McCleary Religion and Economic Growth Across Countries, 68.5 Am. Soc. Rev. 760-781 (2003). Contra Wonsub Eum Religion and Economic Development – A Study on Religious Variables Influencing GDP Growth Over Countries, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley (2011), available at https://www.econ.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/eum_wonsub.pdf.

[66] Brian J. Grim & Phillip Connor Changing Religion, Changing Economies: Future Global Religious and Economic Growth, Religious Freedom & Business Foundation (2015), available at http://religiousfreedomandbusiness.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Changing-religion-Changing-economies-Religious-Freedom-Business-Foundation-October-21-2015.pdf.

[67] World Fact Book, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html

[68] See Farr, supra note 22.

[69] Id.

Leave a Reply