Katniss Xuejiao Li[*]
[This essay is available in PDF at thisĀ link]
This Article proposes and develops a concept of performative economic sanctions, challenging the traditional notion that sanctions must inflict eco- nomic harm to be effective. It examines the sanctions practices of China and Russia, unveiling a strategic approach that is different from the conventional model of coercive sanctions. Unlike typical sanctions which aimed at economic harm on the targets, performative sanctions leverage rhetoric that appeals to nationalist sentiments, alongside a discrepancy between laws as written and their enforcement. Through an in-depth analysis of publicly available sanctions measures in these two authoritarian regimes, this Article reveals that, although these measures may appear threatening on paper, the actual economic impact of the sanctions is often minimal. This strategic approach allows both states to signal their opposition to Western sanctions and influence the actions of multi- national companies, all while minimizing economic repercussions for both the imposers of the sanctions and their targets.
The analysis reveals that both China and Russia have legislated (anti)sanc- tions laws with coercive potential, such as asset freezes; however, the actual enforcement of these laws does not result in substantial economic harm to their targets. This observation raises questions about the effectiveness of sanctions as purely economic tools and introduces the concept of performative sanctions. These sanctions serve to project a strong stance against external pressures and communicate with domestic audiences, utilizing the discrepancy between the harsh language of laws and their lenient enforcement to create a narrative of national resilience and defiance.
Furthermore, the Article argues that performative sanctions allow China and Russia to navigate two potential challenges when projecting defiance against Western sanctions: maintaining multinational companies within their economies and upholding the principle of non-intervention. This approach sug- gests a strategic use of sanctions that avoids direct economic repercussions, thus offering new perspectives for countries in weaker global economic posi- tions or those adhering to non-intervention principles. Finally, the exploration of performative sanctions in this paper is not limited to authoritarian states or those in less favorable positions in the global supply chain. It also hints at sim- ilar practices in liberal democracies with strong economies, such as the United States, where there is a discrepancy between stringent policies and their actual enforcement. This paper sets the stage for further research into how states across different political and economic landscapes strategically employ per- formative sanctions, expanding our understanding of economic statecraft in the contemporary global order.
[*] S.J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School. I thank Mark Wu for his supervision, support, and comments, William P. Alford for his support, comments, and review on this paper, and Chris- tina Davis for her comments and review. I am grateful for Jane Bestor, Sannoy Das, Lawrence Haozhou Gu, Liyu Han, Eleftheria Papadaki, and Ying Zhu for their comments on the draft. I also thank the attendees of the Junior International Law Scholars Association Annual Meeting (Haley Anderson, Anja Bossow, Cody Corliss, Joyce De Coninck, Mailyn Fidler, Desiree LeClercq, Asaf Lubin, Preston Lim, Daniel Mandell, Brian Richardson, Alveena Shah, Daimeon Shanks, Melissa Stewart, Omar Yousef Shehabi), my colleagues in the International Trade, Sanctions and/or Economic Statecraft writing group at Harvard Law School (Patrick Byxbee, Aleksandar Jevtic, Trevor Jones, and Monica Wang), the attendees of Cambridge China Politics Research Workshop, the attendees of the 81th Annual Midwest Political Sci- ence Association Conference, and the attendees of the 8th Stanford Law and Society Confer- ence for Junior Researchers for reading and commenting on an early draft of this article. Har- vard Law School research librarian Catherine Biondo has offered great research advice. Edi- tors of the Harvard National Security Journal have provided enormous help with polishing this paper. Some ideas of this paper are inspired by my work experience at Fangda Partners, which I am grateful for. The views set out in this piece are the personal responsibility of me and do not reflect the views of any organization I belonged to. All errors are mine.
Katniss Xuejiao Li
S.J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School.